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TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS - THE FEDERAL PRACTICE*
by
Bernard J. Nussbaum**
O N THE often shamefully slow track of our judicial system there are two
fast-running "mudders." They are temporary restraining orders (TROs)
and preliminary injunctions. Imagery aside, every lawyer knows that when his
adversary seeks either of these remedies, and presses the matter, neither con-
gested calendars nor engagements of counsel nor dilatory tactics will long delay
orders having an immediate impact on his client and of utmost significance
to-if not determinative of-the ultimate resolution of the entire case.'
The swiftness of TRO and preliminary injunction proceedings and their im-
portance to the entire case require a working knowledge, not only of generally
applicable substantive equity rules but also of the procedures involved. Famili-
arity with the federal practice is essential because many important types of
cases often involving applications for interim restraints are cases in which
federal jurisdiction is exclusive.! Even when federal jurisdiction is concurrent
with state court jurisdiction,8 familiarity with federal practice will allow the
plaintiff intelligently to choose between the state and federal forums. Likewise,
the defendant in a case commenced in the state court but involving concurrent
jurisdiction will typically be able to choose between the state and federal for-
ums." Whether to remove to federal court may well depend on the differences
in the state and federal practice.
This Article deals with obtaining and resisting interim restraints in the fed-
eral court. The orientation of the Article is procedural, but in the area of in-
terim restraints, as elsewhere, substance and procedure merge and at times
procedure overtakes substance. Accordingly, some substantive matters are also
discussed.
* An earlier version of this Article was delivered at a program on aspects of commercial
litigation sponsored by the Practicing Law Institute in New York City on September 16,
17, 1971.
* * A.B., Knox College; J.D., University of Chicago. Attorney at Law, Chicago, Illinois.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his colleagues, Dustin E. Neumark
and Linda J. Silberman, now Assistant Professor of Law, New York University, in cases on
which we worked together and had the experiences which are reflected in this Article.
1 While both TROs and preliminary injunctions are conveniently categorized as interim
forms of relief, in many suits proceedings on interim restraints, in effect, constitute the law-
suit itself. This truism is explicitly recognized in FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (a) (2), which provides
that at any time during the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction the court
may order the plenary trial to be advanced and consolidated with that hearing. Even if no
such consolidation is ordered, evidence received at the preliminary hearing becomes part
of the record in the case and need not be repeated at the trial so long as it would have
been admissible if tendered at the plenary trial in the first instance.
2 See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1971); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p-77hh (1971).
5 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1971); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1971).
" Removal in a particular case may be prohibited by statute even though the cause of
action is based on a federal statute conferring concurrent jurisdiction on state and federal
courts in the first instance, as, for example, in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 5S
77a-77aa (1971).
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I. THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
A. Initial Considerations
Consider the typical telephone call from a client informing us that he has
an emergent problem. Somebody is going to do something to him right now.
The ship will sail with the stolen goods; constitutional rights will be irrevo-
cably impaired; a particular armed forces assignment to an undesirable place
will be made; agreement rights will be exercised changing the status quo; a
challenged tender offer will be consummated; an antitrust law will be violated.
Immediate action is necessary to prevent irreparable injury. The only avenue
of relief is through immediate court process to stop the threatened conduct or
its continuation.
While requesting the client to hold the phone, immediately attend to some
housekeeping matters. Make sure that a secretary will be available and be
certain that she is a notary because affidavits will be needed. If other lawyers
are available in the office, get at least two-one for research and one to help
with the drafting of documents and the interviewing of potential witnesses.
Returning to the client, obtain a general picture of the factual context in which
the dispute arose as well as identification of the relevant documents such as
contracts, notices, and the like. As a general picture of the factual context de-
velops one should be thinking about drafting the following documents: a com-
plaint, a supporting affidavit or affidavits,' a summons, a form of order,' a
motion for a temporary restraining order, and a form of bond."
It should be noted that at this stage it is more important to obtain a general
picture from the client rather than one which is very detailed. The important
thing at the outset is to determine what the general problem is, the names of
individuals who can supply the specifics, and the whereabouts of the relevant
documents. The necessary people and documents must be gathered immediately
because the drafting of the necessary affidavits can, and often should, proceed
with the signatories present."
Generally, the first document to prepare is the principal affidavit which will
specifically tell the court what should be stopped, why it must be stopped, and
what will happen if it is not stopped. In this connection it is important to re-
member that an apprehension of irreparable harm is not sufficient. The affi-
davit should recite precisely what irreparable harm is about to occur if the
defendant is not restrained.!
5 Verified complaints may be used instead of affidavits. However, affidavits are preferable
because of their structural flexibility.
6 A form of order pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 4(c) appointing someone from your office
as the court's officer to serve process should also be drafted.
'For forms for these documents see C. NICHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL FoRMS s
89 (preliminary injunction), 90 (temporary restraining order) (1971).
1 This is important because it is frustrating and time-consuming to draft affidavits and
then find that the client does not wish to sign them because there are inaccuracies. One
should bear in mind that the client may be cross-examined from the affidavit. As to key
documents, the necessity of their immediate review by the attorney is emphasized by the
clear danger of accepting a client's paraphrase as definitive.
'See Bernstein v. Herren, 136 F. Supp. 493, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Alleging that
the plaintiff "fears" that irreparable harm will occur is not sufficient. Beware also of affi-
davit allegations made on information and belief, particularly as to important disputed facts.
The court may deny an interim restraint because the moving papers are too heavily based
[Vol. 26
TEMPORARY RELIEF
It is a simple matter to prepare an affidavit setting forth the facts in chrono-
logical order. However, it is suggested that at the temporary restraining order
stage one should consider undertaking the slightly more difficult task of
structuring the affidavit so that the matters of importance on the motion are
stated at the beginning. That is, state what conduct is about to take place, why
there is an emergency, and the nature of the expected injury. The typical initial
question from the bench at the temporary restraining order hearing is, "Whatis
the emergency?" It is comforting to be able to reply that the emergency is de-
tailed in the first paragraphs of the affidavit. This may lead the judge to look
at the affidavit at the outset and read it, and will tell the judge that the plain-
tiff's counsel knows what temporary restraining order hearings are about.
When the court is satisfied that an emergency exists and that the plaintiff
will be damaged if no restraining order is granted, the next question will most
likely be directed to the defendant to determine how he will be injured if the
TRO is granted. Here, too, is a subject which can be treated at the outset of the
TRO affidavit. In general, if the complaint shows a substantial claim on the
merits (a cause of action is pleaded and there is a fair ground for litigation)
and if the court is persuaded that an emergency exists and that the defendant
will not really be hurt by the brief delay during the period between the TRO
and the preliminary injunction hearing, ninety percent of the task of obtaining
the order has been completed.'"
After preparing an adequate draft of an affidavit, the less detailed complaint
is relatively easy to prepare. However, the complaint prayer should be coexten-
sive with the desired relief.1 Other details follow, such as preparing a form of
order, a form of bond," a motion, and a summons.
The next step will be to begin the necessary research on the substantive
issues. Assuming that the issue is a federal question, the first considerations
are the basic rules and statutes regarding TROs and preliminary injunctions.
B. The Federal Rules
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure covers both preliminary
on hearsay. Marshall Durbin Farms v. National Farmers Organization, 446 F.2d 353 (5th
Cir. 1971).
"These considerations and others suggest that the affidavit at the TRO stage should be
drafted in the form of an inverted pyramid. The most important factors at the TRO stage
should be presented first and then the more detailed story. But the papers should be kept
simple because the more complex the issues seem to be, the more reticent the court may be
in giving interim relief. Obviously, there are major exceptions to this suggestion. For ex-
ample, note the frequency with which interim restraints are granted in the antitrust and
securities fields.
"' It is general federal law that a court may give any relief justified by the facts and law
regardless of the prayer, but in the context of interim restraints it is suggested that the
prayer for temporary relief should be at least as broad as the desired order. See Schlicksup
Drug Co. v. Schlicksup, 129 Ill. App. 2d 181, 262 N.E.2d 713 (1970). In an extreme
emergency it may be possible to delay a complaint and institute the proceeding by an order
to show cause supported by affidavit. However, this procedure is risky particularly given the
provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 4. In any event, a complaint must be filed before a restraint
issues. Studebaker v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1966).
"Arrangements should be made for a surety to be in court so that he can underwrite
the prepared form of bond, or a surety company could supply the form of bond itself. How-
ever, the surety might require a financial statement from the plaintiff before issuing the
bond. The importance of arranging for a surety in advance is emphasized by the fact that




injunctions and temporary restraining orders." The structure of rule 65 is
simple. Rule 65(a) deals with preliminary injunctions and the related hear-
ings.14 Rule 65 (b) deals with TROs and the events that follow the issuance of
such an order. Rule 65 (b) is principally concerned with what is required if
the temporary restraining order is sought without notice to the opposing par-
ty. " Rules 65 (c) and 65.1 deal with bonds and sureties; 65 (d) prescribes the
form of order; and 65 (e) concerns certain specific statutory provisions rela-
ting to TROs and preliminary injunctions in labor cases, interpleader, and
three-judge court cases."6
Rules 65 and 65.1 are the only federal rules, other than those relating to
pleadings and the like, that need to be consulted in preparing the application
for a temporary restraining order. However, there are other rules which will
eventually become important. For example, rule 52(a) concerns findings of
fact and conclusions of law which must be made by the court in connection
with the grant or denial of any preliminary injunction.' Rule 52(a) does
not apply to TROs; however, under rule 65(b) any temporary restraining
order issued without notice must specifically define the injury threatened, state
why it is irreparable, and why the order was granted without notice. Under
rule 65(d), any TRO or preliminary injunction must state the reasons for
its issuance and describe with particularity and without reference to other
documents the conduct restrained. 8
Temporary restraining orders, whether issued with or without notice, are
not appealable, nor is their denial. However, orders granting, denying, continu-
ing, modifying, or dissolving or refusing to dissolve or modify preliminary in-
junctions are appealable as of right."' A TRO may be treated as a preliminary
injunction; if it is so treated, it is appealable." Rule 62(c) concerns injunc-
tions that may be issued by the district court pending an appeal from its grant,
dissolution or denial of the preliminary injunction."' Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure deals with a stay or injunction pending appeal
issued by the court of appeals. It is not unusual for a motion for such relief to
be made by the losing side immediately after a preliminary injunction has been
granted or denied. Generally, the application for such a stay or injunction
pending appeal should be made first to the trial court pursuant to rule 62 (c).
1" Rule 65 is not considered a grant of power to the federal courts. Rule 65 imposes
procedural prerequisites on the exercise of the court's equity power.14 A preliminary injunction is one that will remain in effect during the pendency of the
action or until modified by the court. Thus, it is sometimes called an injunction pendente
lite; it is sometimes also called an "interlocutory injunction." See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
" Ex parte proceedings will require more documents than those alluded to earlier. Also,
their content will be somewhat different. See notes 27, 28 infra, and accompanying text.
1 For these special situations see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-82 (to restrain the operation of a
state or federal statute), 2283 (to stay state court proceedings), 2284 (three-judge court
injunction procedures) (1971).
" Preliminary injunctions are called "interlocutory injunctions" in rule 52(a) but this
is a difference in terminology rather than meaning. Cf. Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471,
476 (1970).
"'See Newark Stereotypers Union v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 353 F.2d 510 (3d
Cir. 1965). Ambiguities and omissions in the restraint order will be resolved in favor of the
defendant. Ford v. Krammerer, 450 F.2d 279 (3d Cit. 1971).
1928 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1971).
*See notes 35-38 infra, and accompanying text.




TRO or Preliminary Injunction. An initial tactical decision that must be made
is whether to seek a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.
Of course, if there is an absolute emergency that decision will be made for
you. However, even if a showing of immediate emergency is rather weak, re-
questing a TRO may be the better tactical move. Even if the court denies the
TRO or reserves decision, the order denying the temporary restraint will gen-
erally specify the date for the preliminary injunction hearing. A court is more
likely to set an early date for such a hearing if requested to do so in the con-
text of an application for a TRO than if it merely receives a motion for a
preliminary injunction. Furthermore, if the defendant opposes the TRO appli-
cation on the ground that there is no immediate emergency, the court will
probably respond by asking his assurance that there will be no change in the
status quo prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction. How easy it is
for the court to request such an undertaking from a defendant who has just
said that there is no emergency because nothing is going to happen. If such an
assurance is asked for and received, the plaintiff has obtained the equivalent of
a temporary restraining order without a bond, and that is the best kind of tem-
porary restraining order.
State or Federal Court. Presumably, the application for a TRO will be much
more than a "stalking horse" for an early preliminary injunction hearing. There
will be an immediate emergency. If so, the first two tactical decisions will be
whether to proceed in state or federal court and whether to attempt to get a
temporary restraining order without having given notice to the other side. The
former decision may well turn on the latter, for, in the federal courts obtaining
a temporary restraining order without notice presents substantial problems.'
Thus, if an attempt to obtain a temporary restraining order without notice is
essential, one may very well prefer to go into the state court, if possible, as-
suming that the state practice is different from federal practice."3
Consideration should be given to the bond requirement of the particular
court. In the federal court, a bond is mandatory at both the TRO and prelimi-
nary injunction stage," but under state practice, a bond may be discretionary."
TRO With or Without Notice. When a federal judge finds a plaintiff's counsel
standing before the court alone on a TRO application, the first inquiry will be
as to why he is alone and what notice he has given to the other side.' Never-
theless, one should not be hesitant about appearing before the judge alone in
the first instance. While notice is both fair and generally necessary, too much
notice is neither wise nor mandatory. Thus, it is possible to appear before the
' See text accompanying notes 26-28 infra.
3 In some states, such as New York, brief temporary restraining orders are fairly com-
monly issued without notice on an "order to show cause" procedure. It is probably true that
state courts are more likely to give a TRO without notice than federal courts.
2FED. R. Crv. P. 65(c). Despite the mandatory language of the rule see text accom-
panying notes 69-76 in/ra.
25 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 9 (1971).
" Note that although notice is a requirement, except in extreme instances this does not




judge alone and, when asked the inevitable question as to the whereabouts of
the defendant, to reply that the plaintiff did not want to give notice to the
other side before the matter was set by the court for presentation. Then suggest
that if the court will set a hearing time-say two hours later-the defendant
will be notified. When the defendant is notified after the court has scheduled
the argument, only an uncommonly foolish defendant would, in the few
hours between the telephone call and the hearing itself, proceed with the con-
duct sought to be restrained. This practice, or any variant of it that might be
compelled by the local clerk is preferable to an attempt to obtain a TRO with-
out any notice. But if for some reason a TRO without notice is essential, take
a look at state court practice, which, of course, includes practice over and above
the written statutes and rules. The state court judges may be much more amen-
able to a TRO without notice procedure than a federal court."
Rule 65 (b) governs the requirements for obtaining a TRO without notice
in federal court. The rule requires that the applicant show that irreparable
harm will occur unless the TRO is issued before the adverse party can be heard
and that showing must be made by affidavit or verified complaint. In addition,
the applicant's attorney must certify in writing his efforts to give notice, if any,
and why the TRO should be granted even though no notice was given. The
TRO granted without notice must specify an expiration date and that date can
be no longer than ten days after its issuance.28 Furthermore, the TRO without
notice must itself state why it was issued without notice. It must set an early
date for the preliminary injunction hearing, which takes precedence over all
other matters except older like matters, and the temporary restraining order
must be dissolved if the hearing does not proceed. Moreover, on two days'
notice, or less if the court so orders, the other side may move to dissolve the
TRO or to modify it. In such a situation the court is required to hear and de-
termine the defendant's motion expeditiously.
An application for a TRO with notice is like any other motion except that
the normal notice time span does not apply. One great advantage of a TRO
with notice over a TRO without notice is that while a TRO without notice
must expire within ten days unless renewed for a like period, a TRO obtained
with notice is not subject to that limitation. Nor is there any requirement that
a preliminary injunction hearing must be set at the earliest possible date.
Whether the TRO is issued with or without notice, it is a short-term measure
and the TRO itself should set a date for the preliminary injunction hearing.
The burden of establishing the right to a TRO, either with or without no-
tice, is on the party seeking the order." Essentially, the tests for whether a TRO
11 In the Northern District of Illinois the federal judges are extremely reluctant to issue
a TRO without at least telephone notice to the other party, if not to his attorney. Similarly,
if short notice is given and the opposing attorney cannot appear, federal courts often will
issue the TRO for only one or two days and set a hearing within that period as to whether
the TRO shall remain in force.
"8 Except on consent of the parties, a TRO granted without notice can only be renewed
for one more 10-day period, and the renewal order must contain a statement of the reasons
for the extension. Some courts have erroneously assumed that the 10-day limitation also
applies to TROs issued with notice. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 226
F. Supp. 400, 405 (N.D. I11. 1964).
28 See, e.g., Lerman v. Tenney, 295 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Colgate-Palmolive
Co. v. North Am. Chem.' Corp., 238 F. Supp. 81, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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should be issued are similar to those applicable at the preliminary injunction
stage: Will there be irreparable harm? Is the plaintiff without an adequate
remedy at law? Where does the balance of convenience lie? What is the likeli-
hood of the plaintiff's succeeding? How promptly did the applicant move after
having learned of the threatened injury? However, at the TRO stage the criti-
cal factor is not, as it may be at the preliminary injunction hearing, whether
it seems likely that the plaintiff will ultimately win, but whether the claim as
pleaded in the complaint is substantial and plainly states a cause of action justi-
fying some relief. What the court is looking for at the TRO stage is whether
there is a substantial claim, whether there is a real emergency, and how badly
the other side will be hurt by being restrained for a brief period of time.
D. Defending Against a TRO Application
In defending against an application for a TRO, the greatest problem is how
to respond to the court's question as to just why the defendant will be injured
by the restraint for a few days. Often the best way to respond to such a ques-
tion, assuming that irreparable harm will not really result from abstaining
from the conduct sought to be restrained for a few days, is to attack the sub-
stantiality of the claim and the complaint. The question on a TRO is principally
whether preliminary analysis demonstrates that the papers raise substantial
issues that are fair grounds for litigation."' Furthermore, a federal court may be
reluctant to grant a preliminary restraint if the federal claim seems weak, even
if there is a better state claim based on the same facts.3 Typically, the next line
of defense is to ask for an immediate hearing on the preliminary injunction at
which time the merits of the claim and plaintiff's likelihood of success, as dis-
tinguished from the substantiality of the issues and whether they are fair
grounds for litigation, will be a criterion.
Another potential argument to counter the suggestion that a TRO should
issue largely because the defendant will not be harmed by a brief restraint is
to point out that, because of the volume of court business, brief restraints tend
to become extended. Under such circumstances, it merely encourages litigants
to ask for a TRO if by that mere request the burden is shifted to the defendant
to show why the relief should not be given. Some judges are sympathetic to
this approach, others give it short shrift. Obviously, it succeeds best when made
with an attack on the substantiality of the underlying claim. One practical way
to attempt to blunt the impact of the TRO attack, when the tide is going
against you, is to suggest that conditions be attached to the order. For example,
one might seek to have the TRO include some restraints on the plaintiff so
that he does not gain a competitive advantage during the pendency of the TRO.
A plaintiff's taste for a temporary restraining order sometimes sours when
the court announces that a heavy bond will be required even for the brief
period involved. The amount of the bond will depend on how badly the de-
fendant may be injured by the imposition of the temporary restraint. Before
considering the merits of the TRO application, but after having read the papers,
3°See Lunkenheimer v. Condec Corp., 268 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"tSee Erie Tech. Prod., Inc. v. Centre Eng'r, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade
Cas.) 5 73,576 (N.D. Pa., May 5, 1971).
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some judges attempt to discourage a plaintiff by saying that, obviously, a very
heavy bond will be required. The likelihood of an early reference to a bond
in the TRO hearing emphasizes the fact that the plaintiff's papers should con-
tain material demonstrating that the defendant will not be seriously harmed
by a brief restraint. For the defendant, the opposite proposition must be per-
suasively asserted.
One final consideration should be noted concerning bonds and temporary
restraining orders. A temporary restraining order bond does not necessarily
cover a subsequent preliminary injunction order."2 Therefore, a defendant
should insist on separate bonds for the TRO and the preliminary injunction.
E. Appeal of a TRO
Let us now move to the stage at which a temporary restraining order has
been granted or denied. The question for the losing side is whether the order
is appealable. The law is clear that a temporary restraining order or its denial
is not appealable because it is an interlocutory order and, therefore, lacks the
requisite finality for appealable orders.3 However, by statute, orders granting,
denying, modifying, continuing, etc., a preliminary injunction are appealable. 4
The statute does not apply to temporary restraining orders.' Whether a par-
ticular order is a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction may
be open to question. If the temporary restraining order runs too long, regard-
less of its title, one could contend that it was, in effect, a preliminary injunc-
tion. If so, it should be appealable and should be tested by the rules applicable
to a preliminary injunction, including the hearing requirement. In other words,
if the district court observes the restrictions imposed with respect to temporary
restraining orders set out in rule 65 (b), the order will indeed be a temporary
restraining order and not appealable. However, if the district court ignores
those rules, a court of appeals may be persuaded that the TRO is in fact a pre-
liminary injunction. Generally, if the district court failed to comply with the
TRO requirements while thinking it issued a TRO, the court will have failed
to follow the appropriate preliminary injunction procedure on the TRO appli-
cation. If so, the failure to follow the preliminary injunction procedures can be
raised as a reason for reversing what had originally been denominated a TRO.'6
In short, a TRO must have the accouterments of a "limited ...sanction of
short duration... until the court has the opportunity to pass upon the merits
of a claim for a preliminary injunction."" If there has been a hearing and the
order is of indefinite duration it will be treated as a preliminary injunction and
be appealable. 8
2 See Steinberg v. American Bantam Car Co., 173 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1949), in
which the Third Circuit held that "[tihe liability under a bond given pursuant to a tempo-
rary restraining order cannot be carried over to cover possible liability under a preliminary
injunction."
"28 U.S.C. 5 1291 (1971).
AId. § 1292(a) (1).
"See Austin v. Altman, 332 F.2d 273 (2d Cit. 1964).
"Bank of Madison v. Graber, 158 F.2d 137, 140-41 (7th Cir. 1946), where the court
considered an appeal from an order called a temporary restraining order, but which ran
"pending the disposition of the suit."
"
7 Weintraub v. Hanrahan, 435 F.2d 461, 462-63 (7th Cit. 1970).
8 Id. Refusal to dissolve a TRO may be equivalent to the grant of a preliminary injunc-
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If the TRO is particularly outrageous, and assuming it has not been trans-
muted into an appealable preliminary injunction, one could attempt to obtain
a writ of mandamus. However, this is characteristically a long-shot.
II. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
A. Initial Considerations
Following the issuance of the TRO or its denial, the next step will be the
preliminary injunction proceedings. Aside from public interest cases brought
by the Government, there are generally four basic concepts involved in the
granting of preliminary injunctive relief. First, the probability that the plain-
tiff will eventually succeed on the merits; second, the presence of irreparable
injury to the plaintiff; third, the injury to the defendant if the injunction is
granted; and, finally, the interest of the public or third parties."5 If the United
States is the plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction, and particularly if a
statute authorizes such relief in aid of enforcement of a statute, the Govern-
ment will likely argue that it does not need to show irreparable injury but only
a reasonable probability that it will ultimately prevail on the merits. The basis
for this lightened burden is an assumption that when the Government brings
a case it is doing so to support the public interest."0
In disputes between private parties the irreparable harm requirement and
its corollary, "no adequate remedy at law," is a shifting standard. In absolute
terms there are few injuries of a commercial nature that are not compensable in
money. And while money damages in some situations may be difficult to prove
in an amount certain or even nearly certain, damage doctrines are available
which put the risk of that uncertainty on the wrongdoer, thus giving the bene-
fit of uncertainty as to amount to the plaintiff.4' The conceptual difficulty of
dealing with the "irreparable harm" concept by seeking to determine the avail-
ability of an adequate monetary award is illustrated by the overly fine distinc-
tions expressed by courts when trying to draw a line as to what is and what is
not irreparable harm.'
tion and, thus, be appealable. Morning Telegraph v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir.
1971).
" See Citizens Community for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y
1969). There is some indication that in certain types of cases, federal courts should wel-.
come applications for preliminary injunctive relief and that these applications should be
regarded in a somewhat different light. A preliminary injunction may represent the best
opportunity for doing equity in a case because, as the business situation hardens, the court's
opportunity to protect the parties, third parties and the public interest is lessened. See
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969),
which also contains the other side of this approach which is that a court must be vigilant to
guard against resort "to the courts on trumped up or trivial grounds as a means for delaying
and thereby defeating" the exercise of legitimate rights. Id.4 See, e.g., SEC v. Globus Int'l, Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 92,892 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).4 See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946).
"One example of such tightrope walking is N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 317 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1970), where the court, relying on Radio Mfg. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 272 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1967), aff'd, 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968), held that loss of sales and of goodwill caused by defendant's
unlawful conduct would not be sufficient to demonstrate irreparable injury for preliminary
injunction purposes, but at the same time indicated that where the economic loss involved
to the plaintiff would be so great as to threaten destruction of the plaintiff's business, a pre-
liminary injunction might be appropriate.
1972]
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Without looking at every case dealing with irreparable injury, what is a pos-
sible explanation of the manner in which courts tend to react to the prelimi-
nary injunction prayer, putting aside the merits of the case for a moment, and
concentrating on the "irreparable injury-no adequate remedy at law" rubric?
Courts in certain types of cases in certain areas of substantive law tend to
grant preliminary injunctive relief rather freely. These areas include cases
where the conduct is of a continuing and wrongful variety and if the plaintiff
wins on the merits, the court would wish to grant equitable relief as a final
remedy alone or in addition to a monetary award.43 If the court is fairly well
convinced that it will give relief of an equitable nature, such as a permanent
injunction or specific performance, a preliminary injunction may seem appro-
priate. The preliminary injunction will thus preserve the status quo and permit
the court to have the widest range of practical forms of relief available to it
at the end of the case. If a court can do so without causing serious harm to the
defendant, it is likely to give preliminary relief. Similarly, a court is sometimes
moved, with varying degrees of sincerity, to observe that by granting the pre-
liminary injunction it is really protecting the defendant from the consequences
of his continuing conduct in the event he should ultimately be found to be lia-
ble.
Although these approaches are sometimes used by the courts, this does not
mean that preliminary injunctions are automatically handed out. What it does
suggest is that the irreparable harm label is often camouflage for the factors
that have really motivated the court. As Judge Friendly has aptly stated, "Reci-
tation of this term generally produces more dust than light.""' In other words,
the test of no adequate remedy at law in practice very often translates into a
concept that the remedy at law will not be the most adequate remedy for the
wrongs claimed. If the case is of a type where historically preliminary relief
is given, a preliminary injunction may be granted even though in no objective
sense can it be said that absent the preliminary injunction the harm would be
"irreparable."'
Another explanation for the manner in which the courts act regarding the
irreparable harm requirement is that the various separately stated criteria for
granting interim relief are really not separate. Rather, they are part of a seam-
less web. For example, an injury held to be irreparable in one case might be
quite insufficient to justify a preliminary injunction in another case where the
likelihood of ultimate success on the merits by the plaintiff is less certain.'
In typical disputes between private parties, a very important consideration
to keep in mind in federal courts is that the more heavily the balance of con-
" For example, in trade name infringement, trade secret, antitrust violation, and secur-
ities violation cases. See, e.g., Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Co., 451 F.2d 1190
(2d Cit. 1971).
' Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1966).
In cases involving large corporations, a court will look much closer at whether a large
enterprise is being irreparably harmed. It will also look very closely to determine whether
the large corporation acted at the earliest possible moment before the defendant placed itself
in a position where preliminary relief might cause the defendant great harm. See Erie Tech.
Prod., Inc. v. Centre Eng'r, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 5 73,576 (N.D.




venience tips in the applicant's favor, the lighter will be his burden of showing
the likelihood of success. 7 Another factor of tremendous importance, and a
handy tool for a defendant, is whether the plaintiff delayed in seeking relief.
This, without more, may lead to the denial of a preliminary injunction. Delay,
together with demonstrated financial responsibility of the defendant, is evidence
that a preliminary injunction is not a critical form of relief but that the plain-
tiff himself regarded it as merely an alternative remedy. " However, it is possi-
ble to move for a preliminary injunction too early. Thus, one court recently
denied a preliminary injunction in part because "a court of equity does not
enjoin an act which is not about to take place."'4
The complexity of issues and significant factual disputes considerations,
while part of the likelihood of ultimate success test, are worthy of separate
treatment in one's papers and arguments. The complexity of issues and sharp
factual disputes may lead to the denial of the preliminary injunction because
they indicate that there must be a full factual exploration of the relationship
of the parties and their controversy before the likelihood of success is of suf-
ficient probability to meet that requirement."0 Thus, the plaintiff should keep
his papers simple and avoid the position of having to prove an entire case with
all of its innumerable details at the preliminary injunction hearing."
Another factor, which is sometimes given more weight than it deserves,
is that the court should maintain the status quo.5" Some judges upon hearing
that the defendant is trying to change the status quo automatically react in
favor of compelling its maintenance. Despite an over-reliance on the status
quo argument by some trial judges, it is clear that a refusal to prohibit a threat-
ened change in the status quo is not by itself a reason for reversal of the de-
nial of a preliminary injunction. 3
Maintaining the status quo has relevance only insofar as a demand for a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction calls for determination
by the court of the need to impose such a restraint in aid of the court's juris-
diction to render a meaningful final decision. The primary office of such orders
is to guard against a change of conditions that will hamper or prevent the
granting of effective relief at the trial of all the issues. The mere fact that the
4 See Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 366 F.2d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 1966);
Lerman v. Tenney, 295 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
48 See Helena Rubinstein, Inc. v. Frances Denney, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). A 4-month delay after termination of a distributorship is too long. Do not delay
after filing suit in moving for the restraint because delay can suggest a finding of no irrep-
arable injury. See Motor Sports, Inc. v. Gulf States Toyota, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1971
Trade Cas.) 5 73,615 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
48N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 317 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1970).5 See, e.g., Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Couture Coordinates, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 821, 832
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"' Two cases that will be of help in preparing a strategy for the preliminary injunction
hearing are Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Couture Coordinates, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), and Helena Rubinstein v. Frances Denney, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
52 A detailed discussion of just what the status quo is, a question of no little difficulty
in some cases, is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the status quo is generally
described as "the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the controversy."
Schlicksup Drug Co. v. Schlicksup, 129 Ill. App. 2d 181, 187, 262 N.E.2d 713, 716 (1970).53See, e.g., Barnwell Drilling Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 300 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962) (de-
fendant was free to proceed with a secondary recovery of oil); Behre v. Anchor Ins. Co.,
297 F. 986 (2d Cir. 1924) (a fund was transferred from the United States to Russia).
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status quo would be maintained is no reason to issue an interim restraint.4 It
is only when a change in the status quo irreparably harms a party and adverse-
ly affects the court's power to render ultimate effective relief that the status
quo argument has substance." The inquiry should be how best to create or pre-
serve a state of affairs so that the court will be able to render a meaningful
ultimate decision for either party, not just whether the status quo should be
preserved." Indeed, it has been held that when a defendant may have more to
lose than the plaintiff, an order imposing an interim restraint on the plaintiff
may be appropriate even though it alters the status of the parties that existed
prior to suit.'
Often it will be possible to preserve the court's power to grant appropriate
ultimate relief while permitting some change in the status quo. Suppose that
the defendant is about to acquire plaintiff's property unless restrained. It may
be enough protection for the plaintiff if, rather than restraining the acquisi-
tion, the court merely enjoins the defendant from thereafter disposing of the
property without leave of the court. In short, a request that the status quo be
preserved only begins the inquiry as to whether that should be done. Courts
have observed that there are situations in which such a plea rings false, i.e.,
those situations where freezing matters at their present state is not necessary for
the plaintiff's protection but is sought to gain an advantage."8
B. The Preliminary Injunction Hearing
Rule 65(a) (2) contemplates a hearing. This hearing is an evidentiary
hearing although it is clear that the court may also take affidavits. But an
evidentiary hearing is not always essential." The test is whether an evidentiary
hearing could have added anything material to the district judge's consideration
of the preliminary injunction motion. So, if the district judge finds that the
loss will not be irreparable, that damages can adequately compensate for it,
and on this basis denies the preliminary injunction, perhaps a reviewing court
would hold that no evidentiary hearing was required. On the other hand, if
there are important fact issues and there was no hearing, a preliminary injunc-
tion is likely to be reversed on the basis that there was an insufficient showing
of the likelihood of success and that the court should have determined issues
of credibility and the like which can only be done if witnesses take the stand."°
If the submission is solely on papers, that submission must be complete.
Thus, a court will not look kindly on merely setting out in affidavits excerpts
from various documents if the entire documents themselves are not also avail-
able."' An orderly record is important and it should be complete even if there
5' As one court recently held: "[T]his Court has the power to shape relief in a manner
which protects the basic rights of the parties, even if in some cases it requires disturbing
the status quo." Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 92, 95 (D. Minn. 1970).
" See United States v. Adler's Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1939).
'
6 Chappel & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1966).
'
T See Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 366 F.2d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 1966).
"Lunkenheimer Co. v. Condec Corp., 268 F. Supp. 667, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"'Redac Project 6426, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 402 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1968).
OOSEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Carpenters' Dist. Council
v. Cicci, 261 F.2d 5, 8 (6th Cir. 1958).
61 In the Redac litigation the trial judge who ultimately denied the preliminary injunction
recounted on numerous occasions that documents referred to in the argument and in the
pleadings by the plaintiff had not been supplied to the court.
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is no testimonial evidence taken." It goes without saying that the hearing must
be on adequate notice" with a fair opportunity to the defendant to meet and
controvert the moving party's case. Thus, overwhelming one's adversary with
affidavits on the hearing date may require postponement of the hearing."
At the conclusion of the hearing the court will render a decision and re-
gardless of whether the preliminary injunction is granted or denied there must
be specific findings of fact and conclusions of law."s In drafting findings one
should be certain to include adequate subsidiary findings of fact. Merely stating
ultimate conclusions of fact is not enough. So, a simple finding that if the pre-
liminary injunction is not granted plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm, may
lead to reversal. The findings should indicate plainly what the irreparable
harm would be and why it would occur absent the interim restraint."
The findings of fact should also support the specific restraints granted. To the
extent that the restraint is broader than the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, it is probably improper. An example of the interplay between the neces-
sity of specific findings and conclusions and of a specific order is E. W. Bliss
Co. v. Struthers Dunn, Inc."7 This case involved an appeal from the entry of a
preliminary injunction which restrained the defendant from using or disclosing
trade secrets and confidential information of the plaintiff. The decretal pro-
vision of the order did not describe the trade secrets and confidential informa-
tion involved. The findings of fact did describe areas in which the plaintiff
claimed trade secrets but did not find that these items were in fact trade secrets,
merely that they incorporated design and engineering concepts that were not
prior art. The court of appeals criticized the findings and order as placing the
defendants into a situation where they would have to test on contempt pro-
ceedings whether certain matters were or were not trade secrets. Likewise, the
court criticized the order as placing an unduly harsh burden on the defendants.
It noted that there was a great danger in a generic description of trade secrets
based on general and vague findings of fact because such an order holds the
defendant in terrorem. The court was particularly critical of the order because
it involved the areas of possible lawful employment and competition. As the
Bliss case illustrates, rules 52(a) and 65(d) must be complied with or the
case will be reversed because the order is too general and the findings of facts
inadequate. Furthermore, one should not attempt to restrain the defendant
from everything. Restrain the defendant from something specific and detail it
precisely.
"
2 See SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 920 (1969).8 FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
"See Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Organization, 446 F.2d 353
(5th Cit. 1971).65 FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a); see, e.g., Bank of Madison v. Graber, 158 F.2d 137, 141 (7th
Cir. 1946).
"'See Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 1967). The finding requirements
of rule 52(a) should be read together with the requirements of rule 65(d) which provide
that every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the rea-
sons for its issuance, be specific in its terms, describe in reasonable detail, and not by refer-
ence to the complaint or other documents, the act sought to be restrained. Thus, even though
findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary for a temporary restraining order,
some description of why the order is being granted should be included.
67408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969).
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A final word on the findings and conclusions of the preliminary injunction
hearing. These findings and conclusions are not binding at the time of plenary
trial. Even though the evidence at the plenary stage is identical with that sub-
mitted at the preliminary injunction hearing, the court is free to change its
mind as to the credibility of the evidence, the inferences to be drawn therefrom,
and the findings that should result from it. Likewise, the court is entirely free
to change its mind as to the applicable law.+"
C. The Mandatory Bond
A bond is mandatory under rule 65(c) except from the United States, its
officers or agencies. However, in the argot of the law "mandatory" has a pe-
culiarly hollow meaning at times. Thus, one court held that despite the "ap-
parently mandatory language" of the rule "the security requirement is in fact
within the discretion of the court," at least where any monetary damage flow-
ing from the restraint would be slight and the application for the bond was
tardy." Similarly, a court of appeals may conclude that the failure to have re-
quired a bond was harmless error and will seize on a failure to object to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction without bond to demonstrate the harm-
lessness of having done so."
An adequate bond is critical because, except in rare circumstances, the
amount of the bond will limit the recovery of damages suffered due to the
erroneous issuance of a preliminary injunction. Thus, if there is no bond, no
damages caused by the wrongful issuance of a temporary injunction will be
awarded." But if it appears that the preliminary injunction was maliciously
obtained damages may be awarded even though there was no bond." Neverthe-
less, do not count on this exception; it can rarely be successfully invoked.
If there is a bond, a tantalizing question arises as to whether the costs and
damages that a court may award for wrongful issuance of a preliminary in-
junction include attorneys' fees incurred by the defendant in getting the pre-
liminary restraint removed. This question is without lasting appeal. Generally,
under federal law, legal fees are not recoverable under the bond." However,
one such statute" specifically provides that neither a temporary restraining
order nor a preliminary injunction within its ambit shall be issued unless the
bond is conditioned on damages together with all reasonable costs which, un-
like the general cost rules, expressly include a reasonable attorney's fee.
""Industrial Bank v. Tobriner, 405 F.2d 1321, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
" Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 284
F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
" For examples of cases where preliminary injunctions were aflirmed even though no
bond was required see Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 252 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1958);
Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954). On the other hand, interim
restraints have been reversed when no bond was required. See, e.g., Chatz v. Freeman, 204
F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1953).
7 See, e.g., United Motors Serv. v. Tropic Aire, 57 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1932); Northeast
Airlines, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 316 (D. Mass. 1966); Alabama Mills
v. Mitchell, 159 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C. 1958).
72See Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 107 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 667 (1939); ci. Benz v. Companie Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 205 F.2d 944 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 885 (1953).
" Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 824, 878
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
'
4 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 101 (1971).
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Another possible exception arises where federal jurisdiction rests on diver-
sity of citizenship and the state law regarding security for the issuance of an
interim restraint includes a provision for attorneys' fees. It has been held in
a diversity case that if the restraint was wrongfully issued attorneys' fees are
recoverable in the federal action as they would be in the state court.'5
There is some authority to the effect that there can be no recovery on the
bond, even if the preliminary injunction is set aside, unless and until a final
judgment is rendered in favor of the erroneously enjoined party."0 But this
seems to be clearly wrong and flies in the face of the rule. Thus, the better
authority would be that one is entitled to recovery on the bond when it develops
that the preliminary injunction was wrongfully issued, not when the case has
ultimately been determined on the merits.
D. Enforcement of Interim Restraints
There are basically two classic ways to enforce interim restraints. These two
routes, which can be used both together and separately, are civil contempt and
criminal contempt. It is familiar law that in criminal and civil contempt pro-
ceedings for violation of a permanent restraint, the validity of the restraint
itself cannot be attacked. This is so under the principles barring collateral
attacks on judgments and res judicata. However, when a preliminary injunction
has been violated and the enforcement proceeding is a civil contempt, there
is now some authority that the party charged with that contempt may, in re-
sponse to the order to show cause, challenge the validity of the preliminary in-
junction itself." But if the party is charged with criminal contempt for the
same violation, an attack on the validity of the preliminary injunction may not
be maintained since, in the criminal contempt context, the court is vindicating
its authority rather than invoking the plaintiff's remedy."' Furthermore, if a
party has been held guilty of civil contempt and then the preliminary injunc-
tion is reversed, the civil contempt order falls of its own weight. However,
unless the preliminary injunction was issued frivolously (whatever that
means), a criminal contempt conviction survives a reversal of the preliminary
injunction order."
E. Appeal of a Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction, though by definition interlocutory, is appealable."m
However, the mere fact that the complaint asks for a preliminary injunction
' Bulova Watch Co. v. Rogers-Kent, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.S.C. 1960). This
may be the only case so holding and its result may be questioned under the doctrine of Han-
na v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Hanna had nothing to do with injunctions but
dealt with the interplay between Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the federal
rules in a diversity jurisdiction situation. The Court in Hanna said, "When a situation is
covered by one of the federal rules the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical
relatively unguided Erie choice." 380 U.S. at 471.
" Meeker v. Stuart, 188 F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1960). However, this authority is weak
when the precedents on which it relies are analyzed.
"'See NLRB v. Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 428 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1970).
But cf. Backo v. Local 281, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 308 F. Supp. 172, 176-77 (N.D.N.Y.
1969), which draws no distinction between civil and criminal contempt with regard to
whether the defendant may challenge the validity of the interim restraint in the contempt
proceedings. However, the court held that the restraint had properly issued.
78See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).7 9 Id.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1971).
1972]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
does not make interlocutory orders, other than those expressly dealing with
preliminary injunction relief, appealable. For example, the denial of a plain-
tiff's summary judgment motion, where no order specifically granting or de-
nying preliminary injunctive relief is made, is not appealable even though the
complaint asks for preliminary injunctive relief."'
The scope of review on appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction is limited. In Jones v. Snead the court stated the general rule that:
"Our scope of review is narrow. We consider only the district court's order de-
nying the injunction and those questions presented by that specific order ....
The trial court's discretion to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is sub-
ject to reversal only for abuse of discretion or error of law."'
There is no provision for a supersedeas writ pending appeal. However, both
in the district court and in the court of appeals one can apply for an order
either granting or staying a preliminary injunction pending appeal.*3 In prac-
tice, such stays are frequently given and the appeal expedited. In order to
obtain an injunction pending an appeal it is necessary to show a strong likeli-
hood of success on the appeal and irreparable harm. 4 However, more stringent
standards have been stated. One appellate court said that a preliminary in-
junction would not be stayed pending appeal because the district court's order
was not "of such doubtful validity in law that its operation should be restrained
until the hearing of the appeal."'"
Of course, a stay on appeal should not be granted routinely. Routine grants
of such stays, or as they are more accurately called, preliminary injunctions
pending appeal, can only serve to encourage plaintiffs to bring preliminary
injunction motions of insufficient merit knowing that even if they lose below
they can, in large measure, achieve their purpose by appealing, regardless of
the merits. A stay of the district court's order or a preliminary injunction
pending the appeal should only be issued where it clearly appears that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion. Where the moving papers to the court of ap-
peals do not show such abuse, the stay should be denied. Otherwise, a losing
party in the trial court may gain the fruits of victory simply by appealing."
If one asks for an injunction pending appeal he must be prepared to have
the court of appeals expedite the hearing on the merits of the appeal from the
denial of the temporary injunction. This is precisely what happened in Redac
v, Allstate Insurance Co." There the court was presented with a motion for an
injunction pending an appeal, the preliminary injunction having been denied
by the district court. The defendant urged that it was ready to argue the merits
of the appeal itself on the papers submitted in opposition to the motion for
an injunction pending appeal. Not only did the court hear the argument on
"'See, e.g., Madry v. Sorel, 440 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1971); Alart Associates, Inc. v.
Aptaker, 402 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968).
82431 F.2d 1115, 1116 (8th Cir. 1970).
"3See FED. R. Civ. P. 62(c); FED. R. APP. P. 8.
"Benoit v. Gardner, 345 F.2d 792 (lst Cir. 1965).
"United States v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 292 F.2d 190, 191 (2d Cit.
1961).
"See Jimenez v. Barber, 252 F.2d 550 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 943 (1958).




the merits of the denial of the preliminary injunction within an hour of two
after that offer was made, but it decided the matter on the following day by
affirming the district court's order in a full opinion.
Of course, if a preliminary injunction is denied, the defendant still proceeds
at his peril with the conduct unsuccessfully sought to be restrained. The dis-
trict court retains jurisdiction to order correction of what has been done after
the preliminary injunction has been denied. In other words, the denial of the
preliminary injunction is just that and no more. It does not place an imprimatur
on the action that the plaintiff tried to stop. This is one reason why the denial
of the preliminary injunction does not automatically moot a case. Another
reason a case is not mooted by the denial of a preliminary injunction is that
even if the plaintiff has not specifically asked for damages, he can still obtain
them or any other appropriate relief warranted by his case. In short, a district
court commits error if it dismisses a complaint merely because it has denied
the preliminary injunction."
III. CONCLUSION
Proceedings for interim restraints place severe demands on the most re-
sourceful advocate. Their presentation and defense call into play the trial law-
yer's essential skills of rapid and knowledgeable planning and response in a
formalized adversary context. Hopefully, the foregoing review of the pro-
cedural and basic substantive considerations involved in such proceedings in
the federal courts will assist in the exercise of that skill, thereby furthering the
end result of the trial lawyer's work-the just and peaceful resolution of
serious disputes.
88See SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970); Sooner State Dairies, Inc. v.
Townley's Dairy Co., 406 F.2d 1328 (10th Cit. 1969).
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